

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT


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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:



 Executive Secretary

8/22/83

Date



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM



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S/S 8323526

83 AUG 19 PM 10:15

Date August 19, 1983

For: Mr. William P. Clark
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan **From:** Mr. John Moakley
Date: 8/19/83 **Subject:** Ltr to Pres FM 106 Congressmen

Re ASAT

WH Referral Dated: July 29, 1983

NSC ID# 8305282
(if any)

The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- ☒ A draft reply is attached.
- ☐ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- ☐ A translation is attached.
- ☐ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- ☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- ☐ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- ☐ Other.

83 AUG 20 AM 2:01

Remarks: The attached incoming letter is almost exactly the same as another letter on this subject addressed to the President from Dr. Hans Bethe and other scientists. (S/S 8323009, NSC 154475). A direct reply to the Bethe letter was sent by PM Director RADM. Howe August 17, a copy of which was forwarded to you via S/S 8323526, NSC 8305282. The attached draft reply is in substance the same as already used in RADM Charles Hill's Howe's reply to Dr. Bethe.

John Moakley
Executive Secretary

Drafted: PM/SNP: JMHall
8/8/83 x25399

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

Cleared: PM: RDean
PM/SNP: JAGordon
EUR/SOV: LNapper
H: E Bowen
OES/SAT: WLowell
P: AKanter
ACDA: VAlessi
CIA:

NASA: PSmith
NSC:
OSD: KStansberry

DCI
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SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Moakley:

I have been asked to reply on behalf of the President to the July 19, 1983 letter in which you and a number of colleagues urged that the United States propose to the Soviet Union a mutual moratorium on the testing of antisatellite weapons in space.

As you know, the United States government has a broad commitment to achieving equitable and effective arms control measures. This commitment is reflected in our proposals for substantial, verifiable reductions in nuclear and conventional arsenals in the ongoing START, INF, and MBFR negotiations, and in our proposals in other areas of arms control as well. This commitment also extends to issues of outer space arms control. We are parties to a number of existing agreements containing space arms control provisions. The US National Space Policy, released by the President on July 4, 1982, states that "the United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security."

During 1978-1979, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted bilateral negotiations specifically on antisatellite arms control. These negotiations made it clear, however, that there are significant substantive problems for which solutions must be found before we are in a position to make serious, practical proposals for reaching an agreement. Because of these problems it cannot be assumed that, should a moratorium

The Honorable
John Joseph Moakley,
House of Representatives.

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on testing take place, a verifiable antisatellite arms control agreement necessarily will follow a reasonable time thereafter. In the absence of such an expectation, a moratorium would put the US in the position of accepting for the indefinite future a proven Soviet ASAT capability which we could not deter with a system of our own.

Among the problems is one to which you refer in your letter, that of verification. To date, no satisfactory way has been found to verify effectively the dismantling and destruction of the operational Soviet ASAT system. The system is relatively small and is fitted to a Soviet space booster used for other space launch missions. We do not know how many such ASAT systems have been manufactured, and it would be relatively easy to maintain a covert supply for use in a crisis. Since satellites which serve US and Allied national security are very few in number, any Soviet cheating on an ASAT agreement, even on a small scale, could pose a prohibitive risk.

There are also problems in defining such broad terms as space "weapons". There are a number of weapons systems, such as the Soviet ABM system, which while not designed for ASAT use could have some residual ASAT capability. These definitional problems would further complicate the negotiation of a test moratorium.

With respect to the assumption in your letter that an "arms race" in space exists, I would point out that US use of space has always been non-aggressive. Other than a commitment to develop an antisatellite capability similar to that which the

-3-

Soviet Union already possesses, the US has no commitment to develop any space weapons systems. The purpose of the US ASAT capability, which has been in development for several years, is two-fold: first, to deter threats to our own space systems, and second, within such limits as are imposed by international law, to deny any adversary the use of space-based systems that provide support for hostile military forces. We consider this a prudent response to the existing Soviet ASAT weapon, and to Soviet deployment in recent years of a number of military satellites which, while not weapons themselves, are designed to support directly the USSR's terrestrial forces in the event of a conflict.

We continue to study these issues carefully, and are presently participating in multilateral talks in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on a mandate for a new Working Group to discuss space arms control. As I have noted, however, difficult obstacles remain, and at present we believe it is advisable to continue with the CD discussions, but not to enter into negotiations in this area unless concrete proposals can be developed which surmount these obstacles.

Sincerely,

JMH

Drafted:PM/SNP:JMHall
8/8/83 x25399 0060C

Cleared:PM:RDean
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EUR/SOV:LNapper
H:EBowen
OES/SAT:WLowell
P:AKanter
ACDA:VAlessi
CIA
JCS:CPearcy
NASA:PSmith
NSC:
OSD:KStansberry

cn

STAT

ID 8305282

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PAGE E01

REFERRAL

DATE: 29 JUL 83

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: MOAKLEY, JOHN J

DATE: 19 JUL 83

KEYWORDS: ASAT


CO

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM 106 CONGRESSMEN RE ASAT

REQUIRED ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE DATE: 04 AUG 83

COMMENTS: -----



FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*Rec'd 5/5-I
7/29-2310
gab*

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

July 19, 1983

154870

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are deeply concerned about the prospect of an arms race in space and strongly believe that it is in the supreme national security interest of the United States to avoid such a race. The U.S. is highly dependent on its space-based military assets for vital communications, navigation, intelligence, and treaty verification purposes. Satellites provide essential and irreplaceable command and control services to our conventional and nuclear forces. The continued development of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities would jeopardize our security, erode international stability, and undermine the possibility for reaching future arms control agreements.

The United States should immediately propose to the Soviet Union a mutual moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons in space.

A mutual moratorium on ASAT testing would slow the momentum of the arms race in space, as well as set the stage for negotiations limiting such weapons. If the new American ASAT is tested to operational readiness, the verification problems it would create could very well preclude any future negotiations to ban ASAT's. Given the difficulties that such negotiations will surely face and the time needed to reach agreement on, and ratify, a space weapons treaty, it is important that we not undercut such an effort by continued ASAT testing. The present Soviet ASAT has very limited capabilities, since it cannot attack our most vital military satellites and has a demonstrated low reliability rate. Thus, a mutual ban on ASAT testing would not place the U.S. at a disadvantage. Since the American ASAT is much more advanced and capable than the Soviet ASAT, there are compelling incentives for Soviet compliance with the mutual test moratorium.

Historical precedent for the use of mutual declaratory policies to regulate the superpower arms race has already been established. On August 5th we will mark the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. That treaty was preceded by a test moratorium, established in 1958 through mutual declarations by the Soviet Union and the United States. The speed with which the treaty was concluded was in part a product of the experience gained during this mutual test moratorium.

President Reagan


Page II

July 19, 1983

This is a matter of the utmost concern. We urge you to take the historical initiative and move immediately to propose to the Soviet leadership a mutual moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons in space.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,


JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY, M.C.


MEL LEVINE, M.C.



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

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

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President Reagan

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

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

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

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
President Reagan

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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President Reagan

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
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

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

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

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

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

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President Reagan


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

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

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

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

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

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